Blue Ribbon Task Force on UAS Mitigation at Airports

INTERIM REPORT
JULY 2019
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INTRODUCTION

The Blue Ribbon Task Force was charged to provide recommendations to airports and the federal government regarding UAS mitigation at airports – including but not limited to reviewing UAS and counter-UAS technology, airport protocols for dealing with UAS incursions, and the policy framework around UAS integration and mitigation in and around airports.
The volume of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operations in recent years has far exceeded all estimates and has presented both great opportunities and great challenges for both the U.S. and Canadian federal governments and the aviation community. This is especially true in the airport environment, where authorized UAS have numerous potential applications, including perimeter security, facility surveying and inspection, and emergency response support. Such applications are currently the subject of demonstration and operational projects underway at several airports in the United States and Canada. On the other hand, unauthorized UAS operations on or in the vicinity of airports have great potential to disrupt operations. The threat of UAS intrusions introduces substantial risk and highlights the need for solutions that can safeguard airports from rogue UAS. Recent UAS incidents at airports raise concerns of gaps in safety and security and underscore the need for airports to have clear policies to manage these incidents. Airport security is no longer limited to the perimeter of the airport; measures must be taken to protect beyond the perimeter for departing and approaching aircraft. These recent incursions around airports demonstrate that more needs to be done and at a faster pace than the regulatory process allows.

The Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA) and the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) commissioned the Blue Ribbon Task Force on UAS Mitigation at Airports (BRTF) in April 2019 to study the issue of UAS integration, detection, identification, and mitigation in and around airports. The BRTF was charged with providing recommendations to airports and the U.S. and Canadian governments regarding UAS mitigation at airports—including but not limited to reviewing UAS and counter-UAS (C-UAS) technology, airport protocols for addressing UAS incursions, and the policy framework around UAS integration and mitigation in and around airports.

This report represents the first phase of the BRTF’s exploration work and is only an interim report. A more comprehensive report is underway for publication later in 2019.
MICHAEL HUERTA

CO-CHAIR
FORMER ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Michael Huerta is the former Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States of America. Huerta was sworn into office on January 7, 2013, for a five-year term. Huerta was responsible for the safety and efficiency of the largest aerospace system in the world and oversaw a $15.9 billion budget and more than 47,000 employees.

DEBORAH FLINT

CO-CHAIR
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, LOS ANGELES WORLD AIRPORTS

Deborah Flint was appointed Chief Executive Officer of Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) in June 2015, with oversight of Los Angeles International (LAX) and Van Nuys (VNY) airports. LAX is currently the fourth busiest airport in the world. Flint leads the team responsible for creating a world class airport that is a modern reflection of today’s global society.

JOHN PISTOLE

FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, TSA & FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FBI

John S. Pistole is the former administrator of the United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and a former deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

TRISH GILBERT

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION

Trish Gilbert has served as the National Air Traffic Controllers Association’s seventh executive vice president since she was first elected in September 2009.

RICH DAVIS

FORMER MANAGING DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL SECURITY, UNITED AIRLINES

Rich Davis spent 23 years in the Corporate Security department at United Airlines, where he directed the broad range of aviation security issues surrounding the airline and the airports through which United operates.
Mark Laroche has been the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International Airport Authority since March 1, 2013. Prior to this, he worked as the President and Chief Executive Officer of Canada Lands Company Limited.

Huntley Lawrence is responsible for managing one of the world’s largest airport systems, comprised of John F. Kennedy International (JFK), Newark Liberty International (EWR), LaGuardia (LGA), Teterboro (TEB) and New York Stewart International (SWF) airports.

Cathy Lynn Lanier was the chief of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia (MPDC). In 2016, Lanier was named Senior Vice President of Security for the National Football League.

Scott Brockman joined the Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority in June 2003. He was appointed President and CEO on January 2, 2014, after having served as Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer.

Chad Makovsky serves as the Executive Vice President for the Operations Division at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport where he leads DFW Airport’s Department of Public Safety, Environmental Affairs, and Operations functions.

Marily Mora is responsible for leading and directing the Reno-Tahoe International Airport (RNO), and the Reno-Stead Airport (RTS), with an operating budget of $46 million.

Neil R. Wilson is President and CEO of NAV CANADA, as of January 1, 2016. He served as Executive Vice President, Administration and General Counsel for the Company from 2013-2016, responsible for all Legal and Corporate Services.

Jamie Rhee is the Chicago Department of Aviation (CDA) Commissioner where she manages one of the world’s busiest airport systems, comprised of O’Hare and Midway International Airports, which serves more than 100 million passengers each year.
INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The BRTF puts forward the following recommendations as part of its interim report. Additional recommendations will follow in the final report:

Remote ID

- Remote ID technology is a critical component of the future UAS detection and identification landscape; the FAA and Transport Canada (TC) are unable to accomplish other regulatory advancements in UAS operations, such as small UAS operations over people and beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) flights, until Remote ID is implemented. The BRTF urges the regulating authorities to expedite the publication of the Remote ID rule, and in the interim, the FAA and TC should find ways to incentivize voluntary compliance, such as with waivers for part 107 and 135 operations.
- Remote ID should be interoperable with ATC automation, and the Air Navigation Service Provider (NAV CANADA) in Canada, such that target information, including ID and position, can be passed to ATC automatically and is able to display designated UAS targets of interest (e.g., by a public safety official, in Remote ID) to ATC personnel. The Remote ID standards also must be interoperable internationally—a UAS purchased in one country must be visible in the system of another nation.
- Remote ID data also needs to be made available to airport operations and public safety professionals on a real-time basis to facilitate situational awareness and more effective identification of potential UAS threats and ultimately enable errant UAS to be directly associated with their registered operators.
- The BRTF further encourages the FAA and TC to require identification of all UAS rather than exempting hobbyists from Remote ID and to consider requiring retailers and manufacturers to include identification so that future UAS are not sold without Remote ID. Creating this commonsense regulatory requirement will be a valuable step forward in enhancing safety and security.
- The BRTF supports the FAA’s work to make the LAANC system available to recreational flyers. The BRTF understands the FAA will expand LAANC to include recreational flyers on July 23, 2019 and recommends operators attend its live drone webinar on July 18. The BRTF will follow the FAA’s progress on expanding the LAANC system.
- The BRTF encourages the FAA to partner with the LAANC-authorized USS through the InterUSS Platform as soon as possible to enable another level of known information in the airport environment, including to local law enforcement and airport operators.
- The BRTF supports new TC regulations that became effective on June 1, 2019, that apply to all Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) operating in Canadian airspace, which requires owners/operators of RPAS to follow the requirements for operations in each class of Canadian airspace.

Communication & Response Planning

- Industry, local law enforcement, and federal agencies should partner in developing airport community communications plans that would alert all stakeholders—including but not limited to air navigation
service providers (e.g., the FAA Air Traffic Organization in the United States and NAV CANADA in Canada), airport and airfield operations, airport and local police departments, and airline control centers (to also notify pilots and ground crew)—of authorized UAS in the vicinity. This would help limit concerns about UAS operations in the airport environment and drive appropriate levels of response.

• The prior observation notwithstanding, we understand that in the U.S., the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is developing UAS incursion response plans both at the local level (in this report termed “tactical UAS incursion response plans”) and on a national level (Unified National-Level Response to Persistent UAS Disruption of Operations at Core 30 Airports). In Canada, TC’s Task Force for RPAS is developing similar plans. The BRTF strongly recommends that response plans at both levels—the tactical and the national—be actively coordinated with airport operators and local law enforcement representatives starting at their earliest phases of development (especially tactical response plans) to ensure effective use of local resources and capabilities; effective coordination among federal, state, and local partners; and rapid and effective plan implementation.

**Risk Assessment**

• The BRTF notes that clear threat assessment processes, well-defined and pre-coordinated response roles and responsibilities, and well-enumerated and understood decision-making processes are critical elements of effective airport UAS incursion response plans. These elements should be considered by North American airport operators in close coordination with federal partners when crafting their own UAS incursion response plans—something every airport should have in place. As the FAA recently noted and the BRTF concurs with, “A collaborative approach promotes responsible and effective decisions for how to respond to errant or malicious UAS operations.” The BRTF urges the federal government, including the TSA, to move rapidly forward in its work to develop airport security protocols for UAS incursions.

• North American airport operators, local law enforcement, and their federal partners should work together during response plan development on site survey planning to map high-risk areas for UAS launches and incursions in and around airports. The site planning will provide understanding for law enforcement to respond in the search for an errant UAS operator by first targeting the most likely launch sites.

**Response Management**

• Preparing for various UAS incursion scenarios—such as a long-term airport closure and the humanitarian, logistical, and communication plans required to effectively manage such a situation—should be part of the regular disaster response planning and training airports undertake.
• With respect to the reopening of an airport and the airspace after a UAS incursion, an airport recovery protocol should be standardized to define recovery and reopening practices with specific lines of authority (transnational, federal, local, airport operator), with characteristics unique to each individual airport determined locally.

• While it is not the position of the BRTF that the detection of UAS in the airport environment should necessarily default to airport operators, at the present time, some airports are moving forward with this mission given the absence of federal action. Therefore, the BRTF suggests that airports and the FAA work together to create an "interim standard" for AIP eligibility for the leasing/purchasing, deployment, staffing, and maintenance of Detection, Tracking, and Identification (DTI) equipment.

**Standardization, Testing & Data**

• The FAA and TC must work to standardize their approach to UAS DTI technology integration at airports. The most recent guidance from FAA to airports (May 7, 2019) was a step in the right direction, but it leaves the entire burden on individual airports to seek independent legal guidance to confirm the legality of a potential UAS detection system. This approach subjects a single UAS detection system to multiple, potentially inconsistent, legal interpretations in various jurisdictions rather than taking a standardized approach under a uniform regime. This is not an efficient framework for airports or the FAA. The BRTF recommends that the FAA work to standardize approaches to UAS detection technology integration at airports with further testing, work toward uniform standards, and provide more straightforward guidance to airports seeking to deploy DTI technology. In Canada, TC has not provided any guidance to airports on this matter as of June 2019 but must do so as soon as practicable.

• More testing and data collection of DTI and C-UAS technology is required, and federal authorities must work together on a pathway for DTI and C-UAS technology evaluation in commercial settings such as airports, with the ultimate goal of producing performance standards.

• Understanding the extent and nature of UAS intrusions in the airport environment is a key factor in developing mitigation strategies. Individual agencies and operators are working to capture data; however,
a combined unified effort could produce more valuable and usable results. The BRTF recommends federal agencies and industry collaborate to create a single UAS reporting system that will capture reports of suspected and confirmed sightings, intrusions, outcomes, etc. In Canada, the Civil Aviation Daily Occurrence Reporting System (CADORS) could be used as the recording system.

- The BRTF believes that manufacturers should share in the responsibility for helping to restrict access to sensitive flight locations, including airports, except for those authorized for approved UAS missions, with the incorporation of geofencing technology.

**Education**

- More should be done to inform careless and clueless UAS operators about the risks and penalties associated with unauthorized or unsafe UAS operations near airports. Airports should work with local media, government officials, and law enforcement on high-profile public awareness campaigns about the dangers and prohibitions related to operating a UAS at an airport. Signs should be posted in and around airports, including high-probability launch points, with warnings and information on law enforcement action for violating airspace rules.
- UAS knowledge tests for new UAS pilots should include questions to test potential pilots on the rules of operating at airports.

**Enforcement**

- Laws prohibiting UAS operations in restricted areas, including airports, must be strictly enforced. The BRTF recommends more resources be allocated to the swift and public prosecution of criminal actors. Robust enforcement will also serve as a deterrent to future would-be criminals. The BRTF will also study the issue of whether new laws are required at the federal, state, and local level to ensure that criminals are stopped and fully prosecuted.
On December 19 and 20, 2018, a reported series of repeated UAS incursions resulted in London Gatwick Airport (LGW) being closed for more than twenty-seven hours. In what officials believe was a deliberate attack on LGW, a UAS operator (or operators) was alleged to launch a UAS intermittently from multiple sites around the airport to fly and hover on or near airport property for more than twenty-four hours. The timing of the repeated launches is believed to have been a deliberate effort to prevent the airport from reopening after its initial closure. The radio frequency (RF) signal from the UAS was not transmitting, meaning the UAS and its operator’s identity and location were obscured from RF detection. The UAS’s lights were on at night, however, to ensure it would be visible by sight, resulting in the airport remaining closed. The persistent UAS threat and the subsequent closure of the airport and airspace created large-scale disruptions throughout Europe and resulted in more than 160,000 passengers missing their flights and connections. The total economic loss is projected to be in the tens of millions of British pounds.

Below are lessons learned from the attack at London Gatwick Airport that can be applied to North American airports as they engage in UAS incursion response protocol planning and exercises:
THREAT RISKS AND FUTURE UAS INCURSIONS

LGW undertook a detailed site survey around the airport to understand its threat risks and prepare for future UAS incursions by identifying likely launch points. This understanding allowed police to respond in the search for the UAS operator by first targeting the most likely launch sites.

This site survey planning is an activity that North American airport operators, local law enforcement, and their federal partners, including the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and in Canada TC and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) could work together on now.

COMMUNITY OUTREACH

To ensure that casual UAS operators are aware of the dangers of flying a UAS around an airport environment, LGW teamed with local communities outside the airport to engage in a high-profile public awareness campaign. This included posting signs in and around the airport, including high-probability launch points, with warnings and information on law enforcement action for violating airspace rules.

North American airports are already engaged in public awareness campaigns, but more should be done to inform casual and clueless UAS operators about the risks and penalties associated with operating in and around an airport.
The BRTF recommends that airports in the United States and Canada similarly work with their respective governments on mitigation plans. Response plans at the tactical and national levels should be actively coordinated with airport operators and local law enforcement representatives starting at their earliest phases of development (especially tactical response plans) to ensure effective use of local resources and capabilities; effective coordination among federal, state, provincial, and local partners; and rapid and effective plan implementation.

The BRTF will make recommendations in a future report on the basic command and control building blocks airports should have in place to respond to UAS incursions and how best to coordinate and work with transnational and federal authorities.

"TABLE-TOP EXERCISES"

LGW conducted C-UAS "tabletop exercises" specific to its airport in conjunction with local and federal partners. The goal of these exercises was to practice protocols already in place to address UAS incursions and to identify weaknesses in those plans. After exercises were conducted, the plans were refined to strengthen the communication protocols, clarify roles and authorities, and address other identified issues. LGW recommends plans that can be prescriptive enough to clearly identify communication chains and lines of authority but flexible enough to address multiple types of threats from UAS. All North American airports already conduct drills of this nature for threats including terrorist attacks, active shooters, airplane accidents, and other scenarios. Not all airports at this time practice responding to UAS incursions, and some airports do not yet have even basic protocols in place for handling such an incident. Further, it is not always entirely clear to airports which federal authorities to collaborate with on such exercises.

FEDERAL PARTNERS

LGW worked closely with federal partners, including the Royal Air Force, MI5, and the Defense Science and Technology Laboratory on the UAS incursion response.
Preparing for various UAS incursion scenarios—such as a long-term airport closure and the logistical and communication plans required to effectively manage such a situation—should be part of the regular disaster response planning that airports undertake as part of their ongoing training. Airports should also prepare to be inundated with requests to “help” the situation by vendors if a UAS incursion occurs. Airports must have a clear understanding of what is legal and safe before engaging with the vendor community. The BRTF will be making more specific recommendations on this going forward, and the FAA has offered guidance in its aforementioned May 7, 2019, letter to airport operators. Airports in Canada are awaiting with anticipation some guidance from TC.

COMMUNICATION

LGW faced many logistical and communication hurdles during the UAS incursion and resulting long-term air service suspension. These problems included communicating with passengers stuck in the airport and ensuring that sufficient food and water was available to them while the airport remained closed. Additionally, it was important for LGW to communicate clearly to the media to ensure those watching the news understood not to come to the airport, as LGW was closed to nonessential traffic, and to reassure those in the airport that everything possible was being done to reopen and to reestablish air service as quickly and safely as possible. Some of LGW’s problems related to the UAS incursion may be similar to other aspects of crisis response that North American airports prepare for already.

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THREAT ASSESSMENT

As North American airports consider their UAS incursion response protocols, having a clear threat assessment matrix and well-defined decision-making authority will be keys to successfully navigating this threat, especially as it relates to reopening the airport and reestablishing air service. These decision authorities and matrixes are areas that North American airport operators should consider and plan for now, in close coordination with federal partners, when crafting their own UAS incursion response plans.
TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW

The BRTF has undertaken a review of various DTI and C-UAS technologies to provide an overview and to help inform future BRTF recommendations on UAS integration and mitigation policy.

At this time, no perfect solution exists for defense against UAS incursions at an airport. Technology, on both the UAS and C-UAS fronts, is evolving rapidly. Remote ID technology is a critical component of the future UAS detection and identification landscape; however, as noted in the “Remote ID” section of this report, publication delays of the Remote ID NPRM prevent UAS safety and security advancements. Accordingly, the BRTF calls on the FAA to publish the rule in an expedited fashion. Beyond Remote ID and its uncertain timeline, no clear pathway exists for additional technology testing, certification, or deployment. With limited ability to test DTI and C-UAS technology in airport-like environments and a material lack of data to inform standards and performance metrics, which technologies could work most effectively in an airport environment to detect errant UAS and, if required, defeat a UAS threat is not entirely clear. More testing and data collection is required, and federal authorities must work together on a pathway for DTI and C-UAS technology evaluation in commercial settings such as airports, with the ultimate goal of producing performance standards.

The BRTF found that in the DTI and C-UAS marketplace, a wide variety of companies offer independent options for detection, identification, or mitigation, including those offering a combined layered approach with multiple tools for each area. Such comprehensive layered options often combine radar, RF, audio, acoustic, cameras, and artificial intelligence (AI) software integration programs for detection, tracking, and identification of UAS, as well as a combination of electronic and kinetic options for interdiction. It is essential that the various technological modalities—with their broad range of accuracy, update rates, and latency—fuse the sensors together seamlessly to ensure layered approaches are accurate with their detection, identification, and tracking and can differentiate between approved and unapproved UAS operations.

Commercial options for UAS interdiction technology are not currently allowed in the United States. The law is even more ambiguous in Canada, where in very limited cases the RCMP, provincial police, and Canadian military would have limited mitigation authority.

**Detection, Tracking & Identification (DTI)**

**Radar**

Radar technology, with its all-weather, day/night capability can play an important role as a primary means of detecting UAS-based threats. Radar detects UAS vehicles of virtually any size by the radar signature generated when the aircraft encounters RF pulses emitted by the radar system. Radar can search, detect, and track multiple objects simultaneously, but to be successful, radar must quickly scan large areas with tremendous sensitivity, eliminate nuisance alarms from birds, and discern UAS from ground targets. To help distinguish between UAS and other objects, algorithms, often enhanced
with machine learning, are frequently employed. Radar can determine the exact position of an object and differentiate between stationary and moving targets; however, UAS vehicles that only move vertically or extremely slowly sometimes pose a detection challenge. Airport use of radar requires FAA Spectrum Office and FCC approval. No national spectrum licensing approval is available because approvals are site specific. TC is responsible for approving the use of radar technology in Canada, also on a site-specific basis. Challenges to the use of radar include lack of automation, the high dependence on trained operators, field of view limitations, high system cost, and varying accuracy and timeliness of detection. Radar is tuned for identifying small targets at short, medium, and long ranges and typically provides the longest detection range of any sensor type. Radar does not geolocate the pilot of the UAS. It has a medium probability of detection with higher false alarm rates.

Radio Frequency (RF)

Radio Frequency (RF) is a primary detection source with all-weather, day/night performance. Scanners provide a cost-effective solution for detecting, tracking, and identifying UAS over an average detection range of 1–3 km. Detection uses algorithms to scan known frequencies to find and geolocate RF-emitting devices with an approximate location of a UAS vehicle and its operator. Algorithms are also employed to attempt to differentiate between authorized and unauthorized UAS. RF systems have the ability to scan the electromagnetic spectrum and identify the specific transmissions from UAS. As long as the UAS is transmitting a signal, the RF scanner will detect it, but “dark drones” would not emit RF signals. The FAA warns against impacts of RF affecting the safety of flight and air traffic management; vendor identification of whether systems emit RF energy should be analyzed to confirm a total passive state of no emissions. RF-based UAS detection sensors can detect only a few airborne objects at a time, and their accuracy can be affected by numerous sources of potential interference, particularly line of sight obstacles that degrade detection performance. Overall, RF has a high probability of detection with a low false alarm rate. The BRTF is exploring privacy concerns and the various U.S. federal laws that complicate the use of RF technology, including Title 18.

Looking forward to the next five years and beyond, there is a concern that many UAS will phase out RF-based control systems in favor of faster, more reliable, and higher bandwidth control technologies such as 5G cellular networks. RF detection systems are correspondingly difficult to “future proof.”

Optics/Infrared (IR)

Not typically a primary detection source, optical sensors can use infrared or thermal imaging as well as a standard daylight camera. Electro-optical sensors use a visual signature to detect UAS, while infrared sensors use a heat signature. Optical sensors provide visuals on the UAS vehicle and its potential payload and can record images as forensic evidence. An optical system can be difficult to use for detection by itself because it can be challenged by redirection to false targets and is limited by weather and a narrow field of vision and range; often it is paired with radar and RF options as an additional tool for UAS detection verification.
Acoustics

Acoustic sensor technology detects any object that produces noise (sound waves) and can detect sounds produced by UAS motors. Not considered a primary detection source, acoustic sensors are generally combined with other detection tools. Algorithms and noise libraries are employed to attempt to identify the type of UAS and differentiate between authorized and unauthorized UAS. The sensor must properly filter out ambient noise while still detecting small UAS. Acoustic sensors have day/night performance but can be impacted by wind and other background noises. Sensors can detect multiple UAS, and detection is possible even when the UAS does not use UAS RF communication. Acoustic sensing technology has a low–medium system cost and has a medium probability of detection with a higher false alarm rate, and geolocating the operator is not available.

Counter-UAS (C-UAS)

At this time, C-UAS technology is prohibited in the commercial marketplace. Within the United States, only four federal agencies—DOD, DOE, DHS, and DOJ—have authority related to counter-UAS. This federal authority, however, is extremely limited and not widely deployed at this time. In Canada, only the Department of National Defence (DND) has this authority. As the BRTF seeks to make future recommendations on potential new delegations of authority beyond what has been granted to date, it is important to understand the various technologies that could be used in UAS interdiction. Two primary types of C-UAS technology exist: electronic and kinetic. Electronic mechanisms to defeat UAS require the UAS to be using an RF communications link or GPS. As artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) continue to advance, electronic methods of defeat may become less effective as GPS and RF links are no longer used, particularly by nefarious actors.

Electronic Interdiction

Jammers – RF or GNSS
Electronic interdiction is the intentional use of a transmission blocking signal to disrupt communications between the UAS operator and the UAS being operated. Jammers, also called signal blockers, are devices that block communication signals. Technology can disrupt both RF and GNSS links. Once the RF or GPS link is jammed, the UAS can be forced to land immediately or return to its home location. This poses a problem, as it is possible a custom-made UAS could be programmed to crash, causing unintended consequences. Another serious concern with jammers is the unintended consequence of interfering with legitimate communications in the vicinity of the UAS.

Protocol Manipulation (aka Spoofing or Hacking)

Protocol manipulation of a UAS refers to a third party taking over a UAS remotely by impersonating its remote control. The emitted signal instructions are designed to confuse the UAS so that it operates as though the manipulated instruction is the legitimate signal. Protocol manipulation employs algorithms, often enhanced with artificial intelligence, to take control of the UAS with a new, “smarter”
communications link that removes the UAS from the threat environment. The manipulating signal gives a third party an opportunity to neutralize the UAS by taking over the flight and downloading its data. This technology requires extensive maintenance of libraries of the communications employed by evolving products on the marketplace, which varies by manufacturer and model.

**Kinetic Interdiction**

Kinetic interdiction refers to intercepting UAS by physical means. Many types of kinetic options are being tested and, in limited cases, deployed on the battlefield or in high-level special events. In many instances outside of the battlefield, however, kinetic techniques may not be a viable option for use in crowded areas due to the risk of a UAS vehicle crashing or triggering the deployment of a payload.

- **Live Fire:** The use of conventional weapons, typically firearms, to target and shoot down UAS.
- **Nets:** Hardened UAS with attack nets capture and bring back targeted UAS.
  - Autonomous with the option of a manned launch with monitoring.
- **Lasers:** Directed energy to destroy the UAS, causing it to crash to the ground.
- **Birds of Prey:** Trained birds with protective gear used to attack and crash UAS located in a restricted area.

**Geofencing**

Although not considered in the C-UAS category, geofencing has mitigating qualities built into the UAS itself. This technology can be regularly updated by manufacturers to include new and temporary restricted zones, evolving with risk-based data and information. Some manufacturers have gone so far as to expand the airport area restricted zones from two-dimensional circles to an enhanced safety zone, preventing UAS from entering a three-dimensional bow-tie geofence to address approach and departure pathways, which will prevent UAS from flying near airplanes departing and landing at airports.

Risk-based solutions such as manufacturer-installed geofencing technology are essential advancements in mitigation and should become the industry standard, rather than the exception. The BRTF believes that manufacturers should share in the responsibility for helping to restrict access to sensitive flight locations, including airports, except for those authorized for approved UAS missions. Geofencing can play a major role in ensuring “careless and clueless” UAS operators are not able to interfere with airport operations.

Rapidly evolving technology will continue to change the landscape of potential DTI and mitigation solutions, which underscores the need to approach UAS safety and security from an overall airspace management perspective. Technological considerations are only one component of fully integrating UAS into the NAS. Government and industry must work together to adopt a holistic policy and regulatory framework for deploying technology, securing UAS command and control connections, and developing well-defined procedures for responding to potential safety and security threats.
REVIEW OF CURRENT POLICY LANDSCAPE & CHALLENGES FACED BY AIRPORTS AND C-UAS INDUSTRY

As the fastest growing segment of aviation, UAS operations continue to rapidly increase in number, technical complexity, and capability. The growth in popularity and use of these new aircraft has presented a number of regulatory and technical challenges for the government, industry, and other stakeholders. The safe and efficient integration of UAS into the NAS requires resolving key challenges to enable evolving technology to safely achieve its full potential. Several of these challenges are related to UAS operations in the airport environment.

In July 2018, the FAA released Guidance on UAS Detection and Countermeasures Technology to airport operators pointing to remote identification requirements to be more effective and cost efficient to address airports’ concerns around UAS operations; yet the applicable regulatory framework and its effectiveness remain undetermined. Later in 2018, Congress passed an FAA Reauthorization that extended C-UAS authority to additional federal agencies but did not address state and local law enforcement or the TSA—agencies that ultimately will be called on to protect the public from UAS-related threats in and around airports. On May 7, 2019, the FAA published additional guidance to airport operators interested in evaluating, demonstrating, or otherwise installing UAS detection systems that helped to clarify some questions from the airport community but, like the previous guidance, raised many additional questions that must be addressed.

Given the continued proliferation of UAS operations and the seriousness of the risk posed, airport operators must have protocols and mitigation strategies in place to manage errant or malicious UAS activity until a permanent framework is implemented. The industry continues to work with government partners on remote identification and tracking rules, but more needs to be done in the meantime. Some in industry are not waiting on government and are taking a proactive approach to mitigating potential UAS risk to critical infrastructure, such as airports, from careless (or clueless) operators. Steps such as installation of Remote ID, geofencing, ADS-B receivers, and knowledge quizzes can go a long way toward eliminating risk through deterrence and education.

Beyond these UAS manufacturer-installed tools, North American airports are interested in UAS detection technology but are taking a measured and informed approach to understanding the technology, any associated risks, and the regulatory framework.

The BRTF will focus on developing UAS mitigation strategies at airports, including a policy and regulatory framework that may also be adaptable to implement outside the airport environment. The
BRTF will offer templates for Threat Response Protocols to immediately improve an airport response after intrusion by an unauthorized UAS, determine how best to mitigate this threat, and recommend forward-looking policies.

All stakeholders appreciate the tremendous value of UAS within the airport environment to conduct operationally efficient missions. The safety and security risks, however, cannot be overlooked. The BRTF is seeking to advance aviation and airport safety and security as well as deepen the understanding of, and conversation among stakeholders in order to make significant progress on the necessary policy framework of the future.

**Approved UAS Operations at Airports**

UAS can add tremendous value to airports by increasing operational efficiencies, improving safety, and adding economic opportunities within the airport environment. Types of operations will continue to evolve and should not be hampered by a lack of policy that supports legal use of UAS.

Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority (MSCAA) is one of the lead participants in the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Unmanned Aerial Systems Integration Pilot Program (UAS IPP). MSCAA has been successfully demonstrating for nearly a year how approved UAS operations can be safely integrated into the airport environment to increase safety, security, and efficiency. Dozens of successful UAS flights have been conducted, with missions including aircraft inspection, airport perimeter fence inspections, and security monitoring of ramps and use in logistics warehouses.

The goal of the UAS IPP is to conduct advanced UAS operations in selected airspace to generate data and knowledge for future UAS policymaking. MSCAA is fulfilling its mission by working to “develop operational procedures, assess potential impacts, develop airport and team member communication protocols, and determine the operational reliability of small UAS that could be used on the Memphis International Airport (MEM) airfield.” The DOT and FAA are to be commended for selecting Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority as a lead participant in the UAS IPP and for bringing government and the private sector together to accelerate safe UAS integration.

Other airports, including Dallas Fort Worth International, Seattle-Tacoma International, Atlanta Hartsfield Jackson International, and Los Angeles World Airports are also developing processes and procedures for using UAS to support emergency response, site survey, wildlife mitigation, and aerial photography missions. Several airport tenants—particularly airlines—have expressed interest in or have started actively utilizing UAS to support their missions, albeit frequently in controlled environments such as inside aircraft hangars.

In Canada, Ottawa International Airport (YOW) became one of the first airports to propose a draft intervention plan, incident protocol, and response approach to TC to assist in the occurrence of a drone incursion within close proximity to their aerodrome. YOW also led the organization of a successful drone tabletop exercise, which was cohosted by TC. Several potential scenarios
were presented and discussed among participants, and viable approaches were proposed. Available mitigation technology was also addressed. Outcomes from the exercise included: the need for a clear national protocol to deal with RPAS incidents; the adoption of a standard process for addressing RPAS sightings; defining roles and responsibilities; compiling and maintaining data related to RPAS incidents; having a strong media relations network among stakeholders when an RPAS incident occurs and establishing a common communications approach; considering both the economic impact and the potential physical threat of an incident; the expectations on airport authorities; and the education of the public required in the new regulations.

Remote ID and LAANC

The FAA and TC are charged with safely integrating the new UAS class of aircraft and their operators into their respective NAS. The FAA has taken several regulatory steps to increase the safety of UAS operations, including registration requirements and, more recently, the NPRM on the Operation of Small UAS over People, an ANPRM on the Safe and Secure Operations of Small UAS, and an Interim Final Rule on an External Marking Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft.

One important rule yet to be published—Remote Identification for UAS—is a foundational part of full integration in responding to UAS intrusions in the airport environment. TC has also recently introduced regulations that went into effect on June 1, 2019, which include UAS registration requirements.

Often compared to a digital license plate for UAS, Remote ID will help airport operations teams, law enforcement, and other authorities to quickly identify airborne UAS along with their operators, thereby separating approved UAS operations from errant or illegal ones. Importantly, the FAA intends to create remote identification requirements that will make certain data—including the location, direction, speed, and altitude of an in-flight UAS, as well as the location of the UAS pilot and the UAS’s registration information—available to authorized officials on a real-time basis for airborne UAS.

The FAA’s UAS-ID Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) recommended in 2017, “The UAS ID and tracking system should interoperate with the ATC automation, such that target information from the ID and tracking ground system, including ID and position, can be passed to ATC automation.” The BRTF concurs with this recommendation and the additional recommendation from the ARC that “FAA automation and the UAS ID and tracking system should be able to display designated UAS targets of interest (e.g., by a public safety official, in the UAS ID and tracking system) to ATC personnel.” The BRTF suggests that the Remote ID standard also must be interoperable internationally—a UAS purchased in one country must be visible in another nation.

Information collected by Remote ID will allow the FAA, TC, NAV CANADA, law enforcement, airport operations teams, and other public officials to instantly identify a specific UAS by a broadcast unique identifier and learn information about the operator, which is critical in an airport environment. This capability gives the authorized
individuals access to important data to make an informed determination about the threat level of the suspect UAS. As the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Emerging Technologies Subcommittee noted in its interim report from May 21, 2019, “This will assist security agencies, law enforcement, and aviation regulators to ensure that authorized UAS operations do not pose safety and security threats and to distinguish and focus attention on potential bad actors operating without authorization.” The information produced by Remote ID is vital for law enforcement and airport operators to determine how and where to intervene most effectively and also establishes a system for some accountability to be attached to the anonymity of UAS operations.

Remote ID will also require airborne UAS to provide identification information that can be received by other authorized parties to facilitate more advanced operations for UAS and support future UAS Traffic Management (UTM) efforts, which are extremely important to the future of airport operations. Remote ID is vital for the realization of UTM, which would work in conjunction with the existing air traffic control (ATC) system to reduce barriers to innovation and improve security of the national airspace.

Finally, Remote ID will provide airports, law enforcement, and federal authorities a new level of insight on UAS operations—data that can be used to improve aviation safety and approved-UAS integration and unapproved-UAS incursion planning.

The BRTF encourages the FAA to expeditiously publish the Remote ID rule. The BRTF further encourages the FAA and TC to require identification of all UAS rather than exempting hobbyists from Remote ID and consider requiring retailers and manufacturers to include identification so that future UAS are not sold without Remote ID. Creating this commonsense regulatory requirement will be a valuable step forward to enhance safety and security.

While the FAA is working to publish a Remote ID NPRM, the successful Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) program offers great potential as a Remote ID solution. Under the Part 107 small UAS rule, operators can fly in controlled airspace under 400 feet as long as airspace authorization is obtained from the FAA. The manual process to apply for authorization is laborious and protracted, but LAANC significantly decreases the wait time and provides greater flexibility in operational planning. LAANC provides automatic FAA authorizations for flights under 400 feet in controlled airspace and accepts applications for authorization to fly above a designated altitude on a UAS Facility Map. LAANC is an innovative collaboration between government and private industry and the first partnership under the FAA UAS Data Exchange.

In this partnership, certain UAS Service Suppliers (USS) are authorized by the FAA to provide LAANC service, and the authorizations are obtained
through USS digital platforms. In support of Remote ID benefits until a rule is in effect, the InterUSS Platform software has been developed to allow communication between the various USS during UAS operations. Through partnership with the FAA, information concerning the UAS operator’s identity can be validated in the event of a UAS incursion, thereby scaling the response. With this data exchange, airport operators and law enforcement could quickly establish a trusted set of facts and information about the person operating the intruding UAS. The InterUSS Platform provides other benefits, such as event history record, privacy protections, accountability, increased UAS operations, and accident prevention. LAANC is already a success, covering nearly 600 airports, but the full potential of the program is not yet fully realized.

This partnership and remote ID solution could be implemented immediately without additional policy framework, regulations, or technology. The BRTF encourages the FAA to partner with the LAANC-authorized USS through the InterUSS Platform as soon as possible to enable another level of known information in the airport environment, including to local law enforcement and airport operators. The BRTF also supports the FAA’s work to make the LAANC system available to recreational flyers. In Canada, Remote ID technology is also available; however, the recently published RPAS regulations do not address this capability, so it is unclear if the regulations would require a revision.

“REMOTE ID WILL PROVIDE AIRPORTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND FEDERAL AUTHORITIES A NEW LEVEL OF INSIGHT ON DRONE OPERATIONS; DATA THAT CAN BE USED TO IMPROVE AVIATION SAFETY AND APPROVED-UAS INTEGRATION AND UNAPPROVED-UAS INCURSION PLANNING.”
“THE BRTF RECOMMENDS THE WORK TO STANDARDIZE ITS AIR UAS DETECTION TECHNOLOGY AT AIRPORTS AND PROVIDE MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD GUIDANCE SEEKING TO DEPLOY DTI TECHNOLOGY”

Steps to Full UAS Integration in the NAS

Although Remote ID is an extremely important tool in UAS mitigation at airports, more must be done to protect the safety and security of airports from the risk of hostile and errant UAS operations. Remote ID will allow for quick action against UAS pilots who are operating carelessly or recklessly and emitting an RF signal; however, a UAS operator who has nefarious intent will not likely not be broadcasting a signal that could be detected and tracked. More must be done to ensure aviation safety and the safety and security of airports from the risk of hostile “dark drones.”

In the U.S., the FAA and other federal agencies have not indicated a willingness or ability to invest in and operate UAS detection systems on and near airports. Indeed, ATC towers are already frequently understaffed, underfunded, and subject to government shutdowns. In the recent publication of the FAA’s Exception for Limited Recreational Operations of Unmanned Aircraft, the FAA reinforced the point that, although the FAA will not engage with UAS detection, the aircraft are operating in FAA-controlled airspace: “Small unmanned aircraft operations do not receive air traffic services, but they must be authorized in the airspace because FAA air traffic control is responsible for managing the safety and efficiency of controlled airspace.”

This has led some airports to assume that they must fill the void left by the lack of involvement by the federal government. Indeed, stakeholders must be permitted to take steps to better understand the threats in their jurisdiction through detection and tracking. Unfortunately, however, an unclear and uncertain path lies ahead of airports seeking to evaluate, demonstrate, or otherwise install or deploy UAS detection systems. Importantly, the BRTF takes the position that the Federal Government should provide national guidance on Detection and Tracking technology standards and responsibilities.

The FAA issued updated information regarding UAS detection systems at airports in a memorandum dated May 7, 2019. This memorandum, included in Attachment A of this Interim Report, places the burden on individual airports to seek independent legal guidance to confirm the legality of a potential UAS detection system. This approach subjects a single UAS detection system to multiple legal interpretations in various jurisdictions rather than a uniform framework resulting from a standardized approach; this result is due in part to the complexity of the DTI technology and how it changes in each individual airport environment. The guidance also cautioned federally obligated airports that deploying detection technology could be in conflict with their grant assurances, again creating opportunity for different results at airports around the country.
The BRTF has identified this as an area requiring further exploration. The BRTF recommends that the FAA and TC work to standardize their approach to UAS detection technology integration at airports with further testing and work toward standards to provide more straightforward guidance to airports seeking to deploy DTI technology.

The BRTF will explore the question of what federal funding is available to help industry test, acquire, deploy, staff, and maintain DTI technology to offset what is otherwise, in essence, an unfunded mandate to airports from the federal government. The BRTF suggests that airports and the FAA work together to create an “interim standard” for Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grant eligibility for the leasing/purchasing, deployment, staffing, and maintenance of DTI equipment. Given the urgency for more knowledge about threats and appropriate mitigations from policy, law enforcement, and C-UAS perspectives, this is an instance where, for the sake of progress, the perfect should not be the enemy of the good.

From an SMS perspective, knowledge of a safety hazard requires action. Airport operators use SMS principles to identify hazards in their operations, assess the risk, and mitigate if a threat exceeds acceptable levels. The risk posed by unauthorized UAS is no different—it requires assessment and mitigation. However, once the risk is assessed, airport operators are limited in mitigation strategies and constrained by laws. Some airports have already begun developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) related to UAS intrusions through SMS, but the mitigation component is missing. The FAA has issued orders and published guidance materials for airports on how to implement a voluntary SMS; this information may be helpful to the FAA and industry to collaborate in building a safety framework for UAS mitigation.

Roles, responsibilities, and flow of information are all a part of response procedures after a UAS incursion in the airport environment. For airport operators, however, guidance remains unclear. Local law enforcement is not authorized to engage in UAS mitigation; therefore, it is likely that federal assistance will be required to address identified UAS threats. The process for making and responding to the request are still under development, leaving airport operators vulnerable to a lack of timely federal assistance.

In addition, following an airport or airspace closure, the recovery protocols for reopening must be defined. The BRTF recommends that airport recovery procedures be studied further and a protocol should be standardized to define recovery practices with determined authorities, with certain characteristics unique to each individual airport to be determined locally.

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The May 7, 2019, guidance further reiterated the FAA’s position that it does not support the use of C-UAS by entities other than the federal agencies with specific
statutory authority to use the technology. Moreover, besides the FAA’s lack of support for the use of C-UAS, significant legal obstacles that restrict most public and private entities from testing, evaluating, or using countermeasures against UAS, including:

**United States Criminal Code**
- Title 18 contains multiple sections prohibiting acts that implicate UAS mitigation strategies. These sections include prohibitions against damaging or destroying an aircraft; willful or malicious interference with U.S. government communications; and intentional or malicious interference with satellite communications.
- Title 18 has sections under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) that could be triggered by gaining access to computers without authorization or exceeding authorized access. These acts are crimes even if the unauthorized access is for the purpose of countering or preventing the unauthorized activities of others.
- Title 18 wiretap laws prohibit the intentional interception of communications or disclosing or using the contents of such communications. Recent exemptions from this prohibition only pertain to certain federal agencies under specific circumstances.
- The Aircraft Sabotage Act under Title 18 prohibits damage or destruction of aircraft and could be violated by interference with the flight path of a UAS or some other type of disruption or destruction of a vehicle.
- The Pen Register Act under Title 18 is another protection of electronic communications. It generally prohibits the installation or use, without a court order, a device that “records or decodes” signaling and other information transmitted by electronic communications, or any device capable of identifying information that identifies the source of an electronic communication.
- In Canada, the legal framework for the usage of C-UAS technology has not been discussed with airports, which are awaiting federal guidance on this matter.

**The Communications Act of 1934**
- Title 47 contains several sections with requirements and prohibitions pertinent to UAS mitigation. These sections require radio transmitter operators to be licensed or authorized; prohibit the manufacture, importation, marketing, sale, or operation of (except by the U.S. government) any unlicensed jammers; and prohibit willful or malicious interference with radio communications of any station licensed, authorized, or operated by the U.S. government.

**United States Code – Transportation**
- Title 49 prohibits “seizing or exercising control of an aircraft . . . by force, violence, threat of force or violence, or any form of intimidation, and with wrongful intent.”

**Aviation regulations**
- Section 107 under Title 14 requires anyone controlling a UAS to be the designated pilot in command with a remote pilot certificate or a person under his or her immediate supervision. This requirement raises the question of whether a person conducting a C-UAS mission would also be required to hold a remote pilot certificate.

Although Congressional action will be necessary to overcome most of these hurdles, working through the policy framework for delegating and/or expanding C-UAS authority to other entities is a valuable exercise.

Ascertaining intent is another critical area that informs decisions related to both detection/tracking/identification as well as mitigation. Determining whether an operator is clueless or careless versus
“THE BRTF BELIEVES C-UAS MEASURES WOULD RARELY BE DEPLOYED, BUT SHOULD BE AVAILABLE UNDER A CLEAR AND ESTABLISHED PROCESS IN THE EVENT IT IS NEEDED.”

criminal is an important factor in response and mitigation. Remote ID coupled with DTI data can paint a fairly informative picture of the operator’s intent—certainly enough for first responders to determine what level of mitigation to deploy. Information and data will enhance the precision of responses and avoid overreactions. Research and stakeholder meetings to date indicate that most detections fall within the clueless and careless classification. The BRTF believes C-UAS measures would rarely be deployed but should be available under a clear and established process in the event they are needed.

The federal government must rapidly finalize and practice a defined plan for how to respond to a UAS incursion at an airport. The current federal position, which is that “the U.S. Government is working to develop the federal response to a persistent UAS disruption at a major airport,” is insufficient and leaves airports vulnerable. The recent work of a federal interagency task force to establish protocols to address a persistent UAS disruption at an airport is a step in the right direction. More needs to be done, however, to rapidly develop and practice specific plans for how to respond to a UAS incursion at an airport, with multiple scenarios as part of the planning process.

Education

The overwhelming majority of UAS and Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) operations are flown safely by responsible pilots. Nevertheless, in the interest of constantly improving aviation safety, the BRTF recommends that more be done to educate UAS operators on the dangers of operating around airport environments. Airport area public awareness campaigns on “Authorized UAS Only” are an important and effective tool to warn UAS operators about restricted flight areas. Airports, in coordination with federal, state, provincial, and local law enforcement, should seek to map high-risk areas around airports to gain an understanding of where UAS flights may be launched and to post warnings in those areas.

Some UAS manufacturers are now requiring new operators to pass a short, user-friendly “knowledge quiz” before operating a new UAS. The BRTF supports the concept of a user-friendly test for new pilots to ensure understanding of flight safety and encourages manufacturers to include questions related to the dangers of operating near airports on such tests. Further, manufacturers must educate new UAS operators about the dangers of flying beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS), especially when other aircraft are present in the area. Data from a study published in 2019 by Embry Riddle Aeronautical University showed that more work must be done to educate and warn pilots flying their sUAS beyond their line of sight, because the percentage of flights BVLOS in the study was unacceptably high. Clearly, BVLOS poses a substantial risk in an airport environment.
NEXT STEPS FOR THE BLUE RIBBON TASK FORCE

The BRTF will release a comprehensive report targeted for later in 2019, followed by key congressional and governmental meetings in support of its recommendations.

The deliberations of the BRTF reflect the vast experience and expertise of its members, and the final recommendations will be agreed upon in a spirit of cooperation and compromise. The group remains resolute on reaching a general consensus and providing airport operators and federal partners with workable solutions that exceed safety, security, and policy requirements. As the members of the BRTF continue their work, they appreciate the continued stakeholder support and opportunity to work closely with the FAA on this critical effort. The group remains committed to providing recommendations and potential solutions that will ensure unauthorized and unsafe UAS operations do not adversely affect North American airports without impacting the safe and efficient integration of UAS into the national airspace or undermining the tremendous progress made and the value of UAS operations.

Questions and issues the Blue Ribbon Task Force will seek to address in its forthcoming Final Report:

• The BRTF will seek to make recommendations to airports on a template for communicating about approved UAS missions inside the airport perimeter as well as a playbook for responding to UAS incursions.
• The federal governments, to date, have made clear that they do not have the resources to engage in UAS detection at airports. Consequently, the important mission of detecting UAS in airport airspace is unfortunately defaulting to airports. What federal funding is available to help industry test, acquire, deploy, staff, and maintain DTI technology to offset what is otherwise, in essence, an unfunded mandate to airports from the federal governments?
• Looking ahead at the deployment of a federal Remote ID standard and ultimately a comprehensive UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system to address the evolving mission capability of UAS, including the integration of EVTOLs package delivery services, how will the role of the federal governments evolve? Airport passenger security at one time was the responsibility of airline operators, but it is now the responsibility of the...
United States Transportation Security Administration. Will a similar shift occur with UAS operation management, and how does this factor into the decisions airports are making now about near-term investments?

• What role do airline pilots and other airline personnel play in the UAS spotting and reporting process, and what happens when a pilot believes she/he has spotted an errant UAS?

• Should authority to engage in C-UAS be delegated beyond the four U.S. federal agencies presently holding authority? To whom? What is the role of the TSA? Congress has required the federal government, led by DHS, to make recommendations on future delegations of authority. The BRTF will look to be a resource to the agencies studying this issue as well as to Congress.

• The FAA and TC have made clear that they will not engage in sUAS separation in the NAS below 400 feet; they simply do not have the resources and staffing to conduct this additional mission. Nevertheless, UAS operators are responsible for the safe piloting of their aircraft. With BVLOS operations coming, Remote ID will help to identify UAS but will not necessarily help with the separation of aircraft. To maintain safety, do all UAS that operate BVLOS need to be equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) receivers to be able to know where other aircraft are in the immediate vicinity to ensure safe operations? Some in the UAS industry have already moved in this direction, not waiting for government guidance and instead proactively addressing this issue. The BRTF will explore this issue further and look to make future recommendations.

• Are current laws regarding UAS flight prohibitions in restricted areas being sufficiently enforced? Do the current laws serve as an effective deterrent against prohibited flights? Are new laws (federal, state, local) required to give state and local authorities the ability to respond to offenders?
ENDNOTES

1 For this report, the BRTF has adopted terminology that is generally—but not always—consistent with that used by U.S. and Canadian government agencies. “UAS mitigation” refers to a broad set of capabilities, processes, and procedures—often facilitated by technology—that reduce the safety, security, and operational risks associated with unauthorized and/or unsafe UAS activity on or near airports. Unlike U.S. government agencies’ definition, the BRTF considers UAS mitigation to be inclusive of UAS detection and counter-UAS systems, as well as policies and procedures that discourage or disincentivize unauthorized or unsafe UAS operations on or near airports. The term “UAS detection” refers to capabilities, technologies, and procedures that enable the detection, tracking, and identification of UAS. The term “counter-UAS” (C-UAS) refers to capabilities, technologies, and procedures used to disrupt or disable unauthorized or unsafe UAS.


3 https://www.flymemphis.com/drones


5 Ibid.


7 Federal Register, Docket No. FAA-2019-0364, II.5


9 https://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/safety_management_systems/


11 18 U.S.C. § 1030

12 18 U.S.C. § 2511

13 18 U.S.C. § 32

14 18 U.S.C. § 206

15 47 U.S.C. § 151

16 49 U.S.C. § 46502

17 14 C.F.R. § 10712 and 10719


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